Wike is becoming a problem for APC governors. If they are truly in charge of their states, perhaps it is time for them to get to work.
The emerging Rainbow Coalition is revealing another dimension of Nigeria’s 2027 political calculations. Rather than seeing the coalition simply as another opposition arrangement, it is important to examine its strategy and the political lesson it appears to have drawn from the 2023 general elections.
The Rainbow Coalition is, by definition, a political alliance capable of bringing together diverse groups and interests around a common objective. In this case, the common objective appears to include supporting the return of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in 2027, while simultaneously providing a platform for politicians who feel politically marginalised, aggrieved or excluded within their respective parties. That is where the political strategy becomes interesting.
In 2023, many politicians who were dissatisfied with the established political structures found an alternative vehicle in the Labour Party and the wider Obedient Movement. Whatever one’s interpretation of that movement, its impact on Nigeria’s political history is difficult to ignore. Politicians and political actors who might otherwise have remained on the margins were able to ride on a larger movement and make significant electoral and political gains.
The emerging coalition appears determined not to allow a repeat of that dynamic in 2027.
Rather than leaving aggrieved politicians without a political home, the Rainbow Coalition provides a platform through which their grievances can be channelled toward a common political objective.
Jibril Isah and the Kogi example
Consider Senator Jibril Isah of Kogi East Senatorial District.
Following his inability to secure an APC return ticket, he reportedly attributed his political setback to Governor Ahmed Usman Ododo’s political camp. Whether that allegation is ultimately established or not, the important political point is that unresolved internal grievances can create alternative political structures.
Isah’s reported support for President Tinubu while simultaneously mobilising through the Rainbow Coalition against interests associated with Governor Ododo illustrates the complexity of the emerging arrangement.
It is no longer necessarily a simple question of APC versus opposition. It can also become a question of Tinubu versus individual political interests within the ruling political structure.
Nyesom Wike may be regarded by many as a controversial politician, but his current political posture can also be interpreted as an attempt to create an internal competitive framework around the 2027 objective.
Some may judge Wike’s political methods through the lens of morality, loyalty or political consistency. Others may view them purely through the prism of political strategy. But politics is ultimately about structures, interests, mobilisation and electoral results.
Wike’s confrontation with governors therefore raises a fundamental question, If a governor claims to have complete political control of his state and publicly supports President Tinubu’s return in 2027, can that governor demonstrate that control through actual political results?
The famous political declaration, “On your mandate we shall stand,” is easy to make. The harder question is: what structures are standing, and what results can they produce?
That is where the governors are being challenged. The 2023 election remains an important reference point. Where a governor or state political structure performed poorly for the presidential candidate of the ruling party, the obvious question for 2027 is: What has changed? Is the strategy different? Are the grassroots structures stronger? Has the political base expanded? Have previously aggrieved politicians been reconciled? Has the state studied what happened in 2023 and developed a strategy to prevent a repeat?
Simply controlling the machinery of a ruling party does not automatically translate into electoral success. The 2023 election demonstrated that established political structures could face significant challenges from movements operating outside the traditional political establishment. That experience should not be dismissed.
Cross River State provides another interesting perspective. In the 2023 presidential election, different parts of the state recorded varying levels of support for the presidential candidates. Cross River North, in particular, became an area of significant political competition.
The lesson from such electoral results is straightforward: political leaders and parties must study where they succeeded, where they failed and what changed between elections.
If President Tinubu’s political camp is serious about 2027, then electoral performance cannot simply be reduced to slogans. The relevant question becomes: Who can deliver? And if a political actor could not deliver the expected result previously, what has changed sufficiently to justify confidence in 2027?
That is the question Wike’s politics is forcing into the conversation. The governors are being put under pressure. Wike’s confrontation with governors can therefore be interpreted as political pressure rather than merely personal antagonism. The pressure is simple: If you control your state politically, demonstrate it. If you support the President, demonstrate that support through political organisation. If you claim your political structure is strong, demonstrate its strength. If you say “On your mandate we shall stand,” then show that the mandate has a structure capable of standing when the election arrives.
This is where the Rainbow Coalition becomes strategically relevant. The coalition can simultaneously support President Tinubu at the national level while challenging the political interests of governors within their respective states.
That creates an unusual political equation. The governors may find themselves supporting the same presidential candidate as the coalition while competing against elements of that coalition for influence within their own states.
The emerging dynamic also places President Tinubu in an interesting position. A governor who goes to the President complaining about political pressure from a coalition may ultimately face a simple question: Can you deliver the President in 2027? If the answer is yes, then the next question is: How?
The President’s interest, from a purely electoral perspective, is ultimately tied to the number of votes and the political structures capable of producing them. That is why the records of 2023 remain relevant.
Wike and other political actors can point to those results and ask: You did not deliver then. What is different now? That is not necessarily a matter of noise. It is a question of electoral evidence.
The most significant development may therefore be the apparent shift in political attention. The conversation is no longer exclusively about Peter Obi, the Labour Party or the opposition political formations associated with the 2023 election.
Increasingly, attention is turning towards the internal contest for political influence among those who support President Tinubu’s return.
The Rainbow Coalition can therefore become a different kind of political force: one that supports the President nationally while challenging established political structures locally. That strategy has one obvious consequence.
Governors cannot simply assume that support for the President automatically translates into control of their own political environment. They must demonstrate it.
With more resources available to state governments, the period ahead provides governors with an opportunity to demonstrate performance, strengthen their political structures and consolidate their constituencies. But resources alone do not guarantee electoral success. Political organisation matters. Reconciliation matters. Grassroots mobilisation matters. Understanding voter behaviour matters. And, perhaps most importantly, learning from the mistakes and surprises of 2023 matters.
The lesson of 2023 should be that political establishments can never afford to underestimate emerging movements. The Rainbow Coalition appears to understand that lesson. Its strategy seems to be to bring aggrieved politicians into a broad alliance, prevent their grievances from becoming a completely independent political movement, and channel their energy toward a common national objective.
Wike’s role within that equation may therefore be less about becoming a political god and more about creating pressure within the existing political structure.
Whether that strategy ultimately produces the intended electoral outcome remains to be seen. But one thing is already clear, the governors are being challenged to prove that their political structures are real, functional and capable of delivering results.
This is no longer simply about whether anyone likes or dislikes Wike. It is about a political organisation. It is about electoral mathematics. It is about the lessons of 2023. And, ultimately, it is about who can demonstrate that they have done the work before Nigerians are asked to vote again in 2027. It is time for politics, not hatred of Wike.
If you have the structure, show it. If you have the mandate, defend it. And if you promise to deliver, let the results speak.
Let the APC governors get to work and stop the blackmail.
Elijah Ugani
Public Affairs Analyst and Commentator
Community Mobilzer and Social Change Agent
He writes from the Hills of Ukwortung
Disclaimer: The opinion expressed in this article is strictly that of the author, Elijah Ugani and does not represent Theluminenews, its agent or the organisation the author works for/with.
